William David Duff III

1. PARTIES: William Duff, (hereinafter "Duff, plaintiff, he, his, my, mine") is one of the people of Missouri existing within his solely owned domain and sharing dominion thereof with no other, and in this court of record complains of each of the following: Desk Sergeant (sic?) Frazier of the KCMO Police Department in the North Patrol station at Barry Rd and hiwy 169, and KCMO Officer (serial # 3092) (each hereinafter “defendant(s)”, and all collectively “defendants”); who are each summoned to answer the said plaintiff in a plea of trespass and trespass on the case, to wit:

2. Duff went to the police station seeking help with a theft by deception issue. Clerk (doe) asked for proof of ownership of the property at question. Duff provided said proof in a signed and witnessed original bill of sale for the property. Clerk (doe) then asked for Duff’s State Driver License for identification purposes. Duff informed Clerk doe that he did not use a State driver license and offered other forms of identification. Clerk doe asked Duff ‘how did you get here?’. Duff replied ‘ I traveled using my private property upon the public right of way’. Clerk doe then went to talk with the duty officer (Frazier). Thereafter Frazier came to the counter and asked the same questions of Duff. Duff’s answers were virtually identical as when first answered. Frazier said that Duff must have a State Driver license. Duff disagreed. Frazier threatened to have his agent, another officer, stop Duff as he left the Station and arrest him for not having the State Driver License. Duff informed Frazier that doing so would be an unlawful restraint on his Liberty and Right of action. Frazier terminated the conversation and Duff went to his automobile and was arranging paperwork when Frazier and another officer yelled at Duff to stop. Frazier approached Duff’s auto with his hand on his gun, ordering duff out of his auto. Duff was searched, seized, bound and imprisoned. Duff’s property was search and seized by Frazier and his agent who declared Duff’s auto and property therein would be towed to the police impound lot somewhere in the vicinity of the Royal Baseball Stadium. Frazier did remove Duff’s private plate from Duff’s auto claiming to keep it as evidence. Frazier’s agent serial # 3092 wrote three civil traffic citations claiming Duff’s failure to have valid State Driver License case# 224354(4), Valid State License plates case# 2243355(1) and proof of financial responsibility case# 2243356(9), (See Exhibit C) all of which are additional cause for this action and counter claim. Duff was held in that jail until he posted bond of $300.

3. Duff claims Defendants and all their agents in support of their action have individually and severally injured Duff with unreasonable search and seizure of Duff’s person and property, false imprisonment, Trespass with violence, and trespass on the case, without violence, upon Duff’s Dominion over his own private domain and Right of action.

4. This action stands also as counter claim to charges made by defendants hereon attached at exhibit C.

COUNT 1 OF CAUSE OF ACTION – TRESPASS

INTRODUCTION

5. Paragraphs 1 through 4 of CAUSE OF ACTION and count 1 are included by reference as though fully stated herein.

6. Defendant Frazier having been duly served notice and demand by Plaintiff Duff to correct the actions related herein has failed or refused to make any effort whatsoever to comply therewith and therefore this action must proceed.

7. Each Defendant exceeded his jurisdiction by either directly, through an agent, or in concert with another did cause plaintiff Duff to be unlawfully and forcibly carried away and imprisoned[1] against his will and in disregard for notice to them of the wrong they engaged (See Exhibit A), without jurisdiction or good cause. At the onset of the unlawful imprisonment and property theft plaintiff Duff was duly[2] engaged in good faith and in his own private capacity, and at all times within the “Bright Line Boundary” of his own private domain, and exercising his substantive Right to go with his property upon the Public Right of Way. Said Defendants, without good cause, interrupted Duff’s Private Right of Action, and stating claims of compulsory duties arising out of jurisdictions foreign to Duff’s domain and Right of Action therein, did, without consideration for his consent or lack thereof, then imprison plaintiff Duff. During imprisonment the Defendants took further casual ill-considered actions to further injure plaintiff Duff by trespassing upon Duff’s Domain and his Dominion over that domain, did search and seize Duff’s property, over Duff’s express objection thereto, in the form of his papers and effects and one 1996 Buick Rivera vin # Ig4gd2215t4710668 (copy of bill of sale attached as exhibit B) and original bill of sales for two other automobiles, under color of laws foreign to Plaintiff’s domain and individual private capacity and without good cause shown, trial or due process of law.

8. From the moment he was taken away till the present, Duff, under color of law, was kept in actual or constructive imprisonment. Although he objected to the assumed jurisdiction, those who kept him imprisoned under color of law did not respond to any of his demands and requests for proof of jurisdiction or for reinstatement of his liberty. Defendants and their agents continued to assume the jurisdiction without proof of jurisdiction or any attempt at proof of jurisdiction. Plaintiff Duff continues to be subject, under color of law, to the assumed jurisdiction, will and control of the Defendants and their agents.

SPECIFICS

9. Each defendant acted in such a way, or failed to act in such a way, that plaintiff Duff is deprived of his liberty. Each defendant acted to deprive plaintiff Duff of his liberty; or each defendant failed to act to prevent the loss by plaintiff Duff of his liberty. Further, each defendant is a willing participant in concert with each of the remaining agents thereof not yet named. Some said agents have slowly driven by Duff’s home with an obvious interest thereon since Duff bonded from Jail.

10. At all times mentioned in this action each defendant is the agent of the other, and in doing the acts alleged in this action, each is acting within the course and scope of said agency. The following paragraphs describe what the Defendants, under color of law, either acted or failed to act as obligated.

11. Each defendant exceeded his jurisdiction under color of law. Each defendant acted in concert with the remaining defendants to effect the unlawful loss of property and of liberty of plaintiff Duff.

12. “SERIAL # 3092” is identified as the “ARRESTING OFFICER” in Exhibit “C”, KCMO Police Department. Under color of law “SERIAL # 3092” assumed the jurisdiction and unlawfully and forcibly carried plaintiff Duff away, and imprisoned against his will without thorough investigation, without good cause, and for reasons that are inconsistent with Duff’s Right of Action. One of the officers involved in the unlawful imprisonment commented that he understood Duff’s claim and actually did what he could to protect Duff from the apparent anger of the other officers.

13. Under color of law, “SERIAL # 3092” assumed the jurisdiction to impose various charges to subject plaintiff Duff to a foreign jurisdictions compulsory policies under color of law and without due process of law.

14. On Exhibit “C” “SERIAL # 3092” is named as the Kansas City PD “I/O”, and apparently is acting in concert with Complainer defendant Frazier to continue the imprisonment of plaintiff Duff who is informed and believes that defendant Frazier is acting for that purpose.

15. At no time did Duff injure or intentionally injure defendants or their agents. The incident arose out of Duff’s notice to defendant Frazier that the regulatory action Frazier claimed to be enforcing had no capacity to reach beyond the Bright Line Boundary of Plaintiff Duff’s Domain to compel or prohibit any action taken therein. At no time did plaintiff Duff exit his private domain and capacity voluntarily or consensually.

16. By right, plaintiff reasonably expects to proceed without injury, secure in his capacities. By right, plaintiff reasonably expects to exercise his right to go upon the public right of way unmolested and while recognizing he does have a duty to injure no other in that pursuit.

17. Defendants have a legal duty to use due care and not cause an injury to Plaintiff or interfere with said rights in any way.

18. Defendants breached that duty by proximately or legally, directly and indirectly, causing the injuries to Plaintiff.

19. Because of the actions committed with actual and implied force or the lack of action of the defendants, plaintiff was immediately and directly injured and suffered loss of liberty, Property and imprisoned under color of law.

20. Defendants have a duty to not cause plaintiff Duff to be imprisoned under color of law, to not cause loss of liberty and to not search or seize Duff’s person or property unreasonably. Further, defendants have a duty to prove jurisdiction when objection to jurisdiction is asserted.

21. Defendants have breached that duty. The damages claimed are all a result of the injuries.

22. The damages for the injury caused by defendants’ actions are $5,000 for each day of unlawful imprisonment and $500 for each day Duff’s property is withheld as a result of the actions of defendants.

23. The damages for the injury caused by defendants’ absence of required action is $5,000 for each failure to act.

COUNT 2 OF CAUSE OF ACTION – TRESPASS ON THE CASE

24. Paragraphs 1 through 23 of CAUSE OF ACTION and count 1 are included by reference as though fully stated herein.

25. By right, plaintiff reasonably expects to proceed without injury, secure in his capacities. By right, plaintiff reasonably expects to exercise his right to go upon the public right of way unmolested and while recognizing he does have a duty to injure no other in that pursuit.

26. Defendants have a legal duty to use due care and not cause an injury to Plaintiff or interfere with said rights in any way.

27. Defendants breached that duty by proximately or legally, directly and indirectly, causing the injuries to Plaintiff.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

29. Paragraphs 1 through 23 of CAUSE OF ACTION and count 1 are included by reference as though fully stated herein.

30. Power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself. Plaintiff reserves the right to include additional defendants as they are identified.

31. The purpose of imposing vicarious liability is to insure the costs of injuries resulting from defective actions are placed on the source of the actions and others who make the actions possible rather than on injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. For a defendant to be vicariously liable it must play an integral and vital part in the overall production and promotion activity so that the actor is in a position to affect others or, at the very least, it must provide a link in the chain of exposing the ultimate victim to the actor. The vicariously liable defendant must be in the business of controlling, leasing, bailing, or licensing the actors.

32. Each defendant is an agent of the other, and each has his place in the chain of exposing plaintiff Duff to the actors. Each defendant is vicariously liable for each instance of injury to plaintiff.

LAW OF THE CASE

34. If any claim, statement, fact, or portion in this action is held inapplicable or not valid, such decision does not affect the validity of any other portion of this action.

36. The present tense includes the past and future tenses; and the future the present, and the past the present.

38. If any person shall maliciously or wantonly damage or destroy any personal property, goods, chattels, furniture or livestock, the person so offending shall pay to the party injured double the value of the things so damaged or destroyed; and upon an affidavit that said damage or destruction was wantonly or maliciously done, it shall be a good ground for an attachment to issue, as in other cases by attachment. (effectively restated at RSMo 537.330) ((1973) Section 537.330 did not abrogate the common law right of punitive damages. State ex rel. Smith v. Greene (Mo.), 494 S.W.2d 55. ) (Section 537.330 did not abrogate the common law right of punitive damages. State ex rel. Smith v. Greene (Mo.), 494 S.W.2d 55.)

39. A person commits the crime of false imprisonment if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.

40. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the rules of the above-entitled court. The rules shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action.

Definitions: (2) "Appropriate" means to take, obtain, use, transfer, conceal or retain possession of;

(b) To inflict physical injury in the future on the person threatened or another; or

(f) To take or withhold action as a public servant, or to cause a public servant to take or withhold action; or

A threat of accusation, lawsuit or other invocation of official action is not coercion if the property sought to be obtained by virtue of such threat was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to which the accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, or as compensation for property or lawful service. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of justification as to any threat;

Plaintiff requests this court take cognizance of Exhibits A, B, C, D (Affidavit of Truth of Citizenship Status) and E (offer of proof of 2 distinct citizenship status in this American Society) and apply the laws therein referenced to the instant case.

42. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants, and each of them individually and severally, as follows:

44. For general damages in the sum of $25, 000 for the act of accosting, binding and kidnapping Duff and $5,000 multiplied by the number of days in constructive and actual imprisonment;

45. For damages resulting from loss to Duff of his property in his Automobile including personal private property therein multiplied by $500 per day until all said property is returned to Duff in the same condition as when it was taken to toll from the day of the taking.

46. For order of mandamus by this court for City of Kansas City Municipal Division to yield its action against Duff (see exhibit C) to this court as this court is superior to the inferior Municipal court.

47. For this court to quash City of Kansas City Municipal Division charges expressed in Exhibit C.

49. That the court enter a declaratory judgment that defendants have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and with willful and wanton intent, have abused their discretion and have acted not in accordance with law, but under color of law;

50. That the court enters a declaratory judgment that defendants have acted contrary to constitutional right, power or privilege.

51. That the court enters a declaratory judgment that defendants' actions were in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority and short of statutory right.

52. That the court permanently enjoin defendants from interfering in any way with plaintiff’s future lawful right of action;

53. That the court enter a declaratory judgment that the records of the court not of record are impeached for want of jurisdiction in the Court or judicial officers, for collusion between the parties, and/or for fraud in the parties offering the record, in respect to those proceedings;

55. That the court grant plaintiff such other and further relief as the court deems proper;

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing facts are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

[1] Imprison: To confine a person or restrain his liberty in any way. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5^th Edition Imprisonment: ...it may be in a locality used only for the specific occasion; or it may take place without the actual application of any physical agencies of restraint (such as locks or bars), as by verbal compulsion and the display of available force. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5^th Edition

[2] Duly: ...according to law in both form and substance. Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition

THIS IS A COURT OF RECORD

CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT 1 OF CAUSE OF ACTION – TRESPASS

INTRODUCTION

SPECIFICS

COUNT 2 OF CAUSE OF ACTION – TRESPASS ON THE CASE

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

LAW OF THE CASE